Send firewall-wizards mailing list submissions to
firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
http://honor.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
firewall-wizards-request@honor.icsalabs.com
You can reach the person managing the list at
firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com
When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of firewall-wizards digest..."
Today's Topics:
1. Re: The home user problem returns (Marcus J. Ranum)
2. Re: The home user problem returns (Chris Blask)
3. Re: The home user problem returns (Dale W. Carder)
4. RE: The home user problem returns (Behm, Jeffrey L.)
5. Re: The home user problem returns (Mason Schmitt)
6. RE: The home user problem returns (Scott Pinzon)
7. RE: The home user problem returns (R. DuFresne)
8. Re: The home user problem returns (Mason Schmitt)
--__--__--
Message: 1
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2005 11:11:57 -0400
To: "Paul D. Robertson" <paul@compuwar.net>
From: "Marcus J. Ranum" <mjr@ranum.com>
Subject: Re: [fw-wiz] The home user problem returns
Cc: Mason Schmitt <mason@schmitt.ca>, Kevin <kkadow@gmail.com>,
<firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com>
Paul D. Robertson wrote:
>Educating users to fix the problem doesn't work. Educating users there
>*is* a problem seems to work, just not en-mass.
Nope. Because we're dealing with shared environments - so even if you
managed to somehow raise the clue level in 50% of the population it winds
up having almost no effect because the clueless infect the clueful
second-hand. It's really a problem in epidemiology. Imagine if 50% of
your population refused to worry about AIDS yet was capable of having
sex with 1,000,000 different partners a day* - The numbers are all tipped
the wrong direction, for education to work. Spammers have pretty much
proved that.
>We have to take this to the social trenches at some point, or
>we'll be overrrun.
Some of us have been trying that for a long time, and my magic
8-ball says "Outlook Not Good" and it's not talking about the
mail software from Microsoft. (But it'd be right if it was...)
Trying to point out that it's a social problem brings up this
immediate surge of knee-jerk "HACKING IS COOL!" reaction.
After my "Dumb ideas" article got slashdotted yesterday, I
have an in-box filled with about 250 "u r such a d0rk w3rd"
emails - all reacting to my observation that we need to decouple
hacking ideology from internet security if we want to make
progress. It's not happening and I, for one, am tired of this
fight.
I came up with a really cool mental hack the other day on this
topic, but I haven't figured out how best to approach it. But,
basically, it's the observation that people _HATE_ spammers
and _HATE_ spam. Yet, people seem to _LOVE_ hackers
and think hacking is _COOL_. How did this happen??
System penetrations are actually a bigger pain in the neck
than spam, are approximately as prevalent, and are much
more damaging. But - if you had senior engineers who worked
for anti-spam companies also selling spam-blocker-evasion
tools to spammers, there would be hue and cry. Yet, nobody
(except me and a few of my weird buddies) seem to think
it's a problem that "security researchers" are overlapping
pretty seriously with rootkit/malware/trojan writers. So, what's
going on here? Why are we so upset about something that
is relatively undamaging - to the point where people *CHEER*
when AOL raffles off a spammer's car that was seized - but
everyone in the media does the weewee of joy over some
lame-brain "security researcher" who spends 90% of his
life eating curry and single-stepping through Microsoft
apps in Soft-Ice so he can find an exploit. We call spammers
"scumballs" and "sleaze" and we call hackers "wiz kids" and
"brilliant" and they're the same people, in some cases.
>It's almost tempting to just migrate over to IPv6 space and start again,
>with small gated communities- even if it's just so we get a 5 year break
>between storms.
IPv6 will create more problems than it solves. It's too complicated.
My prediction is that they would be finding new DOS attacks against
the stack for 100 years, except it'll never get fielded anyhow.
In 1998 I (seriously) recommended we scrap all the Internet
app-level code and start over, then blame the whole thing on
Y2K. It actually would have worked. ;) A redesign of all the
app-level traffic that is allowed across the Interet would cost
significantly less than companies waste annually on firewalls
and other IP contraceptives. It's not going to happen, though.
>Computer security: Fighting the digital Alamo from inside the fort. We
>know how it's gonna end.
Paul? Wakey-wakey!! It ended in 1994 when we lost the battle
to the browser-writers. We're just fighting because we're shot
full of holes but we're too dumb or stubborn to lie down.
mjr.
(*Did you wince when you read that? I did!)
--__--__--
Message: 2
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2005 11:14:45 -0400
To: "Paul D. Robertson" <paul@compuwar.net>
From: Chris Blask <chris@blask.org>
Subject: Re: [fw-wiz] The home user problem returns
Cc: Mason Schmitt <mason@schmitt.ca>,
"Marcus J. Ranum" <mjr@ranum.com>,
<firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com>
--=====================_280920781==.ALT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
At 10:47 AM 9/13/2005, Paul D. Robertson wrote:
>On Mon, 12 Sep 2005, Chris Blask wrote:
Hey Paul!
> > The problem is that, without any sort of identity (and there is
> > exactly 0.0000% of net traffic using anything worth calling
> > identity), it is impossible to treat Identified traffic and Anonymous
> > traffic differently, as they logically deserve.
>
>Two words: Identity Fraud.
?! (I'll never see that again without thinking of Scooby Doo -
thanks, P Melson! ;~)
Not sure where you were going with that, but my point is that I (as a
network owner) can choose to treat Identified traffic with one (or
more) level of trust and Un-Identified traffic with another
(logically much lower) level of trust.
I have to correct my "0.0000%" comment, as well. There is actually
quite a lot of practical Identity being used on the net, *we* just
have not provided much of it. Anyone who buys and sells on eBay or
orders something online is using Identity to a level that is
acceptable to the other party. As long as the level of fraud in
these transactions is similar-to or lower-than the level of fraud in
non-net transactions, then the methods they are using are correct.
> > Decentralized, distributed responsibility. If I own an auth server
> > then I am responsible for the activities of those who use it. If I
>
>You're willing to be responsible for your user's behavior? After they're
>Trojaned?
Sorry, incorrectly stated: I'm willing to be responsible for knowing
who the real human is who has used my Identity service.
>Just like the encryption boundary problem that is the reason SSL is
>severely broken as a concept, the use of identity can't be done in a
>system that's not closed, and we don't have the methods, technologies or
>wherewithall to close the software, transport and physical endpoints
>everywhere.
We use identity in the physical world in a way that allows us to
function, with all sorts of weaknesses in that identity process
(sure, put a picture on my credit card, no-one will look at it; my
Mother's Maiden Name, are you serious!?!)).
IMHO, the reaons we have no success as an industry in providing
Identity on the net is that we search for a "DNA-Sample" level of
verification. We don't do this in the real world but succeed in
moving trillions of dollars in assets back and forth every day. In
my own Living With Chaos view of the world, complex problems are
solved by dividing them into chunks until the pieces can be
digested. If there aren't huge chunks of this problem that can be
digested easily (look at eBay), then the beer is on me... :~)
-cheers!
-chris
I'm not good in groups. It's difficult to work in a group when you're
omnipotent.
-Q, Star Trek
Chris Blask
chris@blask.org
http://blaskworks.blogspot.com
+1 416 358 9885
--=====================_280920781==.ALT
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
<html>
<body>
At 10:47 AM 9/13/2005, Paul D. Robertson wrote:<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">On Mon, 12 Sep 2005, Chris Blask
wrote:</blockquote><br>
Hey Paul!<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">> The problem is that,
without any sort of identity (and there is <br>
> exactly 0.0000% of net traffic using anything worth calling <br>
> identity), it is impossible to treat Identified traffic and
Anonymous <br>
> traffic differently, as they logically deserve.<br><br>
Two words: Identity Fraud.</blockquote><br>
?! (I'll never see that again without thinking of Scooby Doo - thanks, P
Melson! ;~)<br><br>
Not sure where you were going with that, but my point is that I (as a
network owner) can choose to treat Identified traffic with one (or more)
level of trust and Un-Identified traffic with another (logically much
lower) level of trust.<br><br>
I have to correct my "0.0000%" comment, as well. There is
actually quite a lot of practical Identity being used on the net, *we*
just have not provided much of it. Anyone who buys and sells on
eBay or orders something online is using Identity to a level that is
acceptable to the other party. As long as the level of fraud in
these transactions is similar-to or lower-than the level of fraud in
non-net transactions, then the methods they are using are
correct.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">> Decentralized, distributed
responsibility. If I own an auth server <br>
> then I am responsible for the activities of those who use it.
If I <br><br>
You're willing to be responsible for your user's behavior? After
they're <br>
Trojaned?</blockquote><br>
Sorry, incorrectly stated: I'm willing to be responsible for knowing who
the real human is who has used my Identity service.<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">Just like the encryption
boundary problem that is the reason SSL is <br>
severely broken as a concept, the use of identity can't be done in a
<br>
system that's not closed, and we don't have the methods, technologies or
<br>
wherewithall to close the software, transport and physical endpoints
<br>
everywhere.</blockquote><br>
We use identity in the physical world in a way that allows us to
function, with all sorts of weaknesses in that identity process (sure,
put a picture on my credit card, no-one will look at it; my
Mother's Maiden Name, are you serious!?!)).<br><br>
IMHO, the reaons we have no success as an industry in providing Identity
on the net is that we search for a "DNA-Sample" level of
verification. We don't do this in the real world but succeed in
moving trillions of dollars in assets back and forth every day. In
my own Living With Chaos view of the world, complex problems are solved
by dividing them into chunks until the pieces can be digested. If
there aren't huge chunks of this problem that can be digested easily
(look at eBay), then the beer is on me... :~)<br><br>
-cheers!<br><br>
-chris<br><br>
<br>
<x-sigsep><p></x-sigsep>
<font size=2>I'm not good in groups. It's difficult to work in a group
when you're omnipotent. <br><br>
-Q, Star Trek</font> <br><br>
Chris Blask<br>
chris@blask.org<br>
<a href="http://blaskworks.blogspot.com" eudora="autourl">
http://blaskworks.blogspot.com</a> <br><br>
+1 416 358 9885 </body>
</html>
--=====================_280920781==.ALT--
--__--__--
Message: 3
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2005 10:35:08 -0500
From: "Dale W. Carder" <dwcarder@doit.wisc.edu>
Subject: Re: [fw-wiz] The home user problem returns
To: Mason Schmitt <mason@schmitt.ca>
Cc: Chris Blask <chris@blask.org>, "Marcus J. Ranum" <mjr@ranum.com>,
firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
On Sep 12, 2005, at 2:59 PM, Mason Schmitt wrote:
> Look at the electrical utilities (I'm going to assume North America).
The key to your analogy is the involvement of government regulation,
as you noted. Without it, we would probably still have exposed
wires running to our ceiling fans.
> The big problem is that the Internet right now is very much
> like the "Wild West" - it's young, immature, un-controlled and much
> about how it should work is still unknown.
And, it's working as designed (security is an end station problem).
> Getting back to computers and the Internet... If these sorts of
> controls
> and industry maturity were in place, home users wouldn't be such a
> problem.
> It just needs to mature.
No, we as Wizards, need to step up to the plate to create demand for
interoperable security measures. Sitting around and waiting for
these issues to get fixed for us is working about as well as user
education.
Dale
--__--__--
Message: 4
Subject: RE: [fw-wiz] The home user problem returns
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2005 11:07:19 -0500
From: "Behm, Jeffrey L." <BehmJL@bvsg.com>
To: <firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com>
>Exactly. You may have never seen, used or owned a gun in your life, but
you
>are probably able to go buy one. Once you do buy one, how it is handled
and
>what you do with it is YOUR responsibility. The training is widely
available
>to you, it is YOUR responsibility to get that training. YOU are
accountable
>for what YOU do with that gun.
>
>Same as your computer.
Correct. *You* are responsible for what *You* do with the gun(computer).
That shouldn't be extrapolated into what *others* do with your
gun(computer) without your consent.
Are you held responsible for robbery if someone steals your gun and then
commits a robbery with it, just because you left it lying on your desk
inside your house? What about a BOT running on your computer
participating in a DDoS (or as a keylogger gathering your personal
information)? It's a gray area when it's not *you* explicity doing
something.=20
--__--__--
Message: 5
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2005 09:36:27 -0700
From: Mason Schmitt <mason@schmitt.ca>
To: Chris Blask <chris@blask.org>
Cc: "Marcus J. Ranum" <mjr@ranum.com>,
firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
Subject: Re: [fw-wiz] The home user problem returns
>> Are my ideas ill-conceived?
>
> no no, that was a general comment about Marcus being right (don't tell
> him I said that!)... ;~)
>
You shouldn't have CC'd him then ;)
>> What specifically do you think is bullshit? Or is it just my approach
>> in general? The better I understand this problem the better off I'm
>> going to be.
>
>
> Wrong tack. My comment was not in opposition to your comments, but in
> something akin to agreement.
Ah, sorry about that.
>> N in a positive reinforcement scenario (short term)
>> ----------------------------------------------------
>> If as a group, we like to preach least privilege, why do we keep trying
>> to tell home users what they _shouldn't_ be doing? That sounds like
>> default allow. Why not tell them what they should be doing? It's going
>> to be a much shorter list.
>
>
> "Make things as simple as possible but no simpler. "? :~)
Yeah!
>> Getting back to computers and the Internet... If these sorts of controls
>> and industry maturity were in place, home users wouldn't be such a
>> problem. The big problem is that the Internet right now is very much
>> like the "Wild West" - it's young, immature, un-controlled and much
>> about how it should work is still unknown. It just needs to mature.
>
>
> The problem we are dealing with is that many consumers do not understand
> what electricity is or why they should expect their razor to shave their
> face but not be able to cook a well-turned prime rib - or explode
> violently and tear off their arms, for that matter. They are
> effectively Australopithicenes and we need to bring them up to at least
> Victorian standards so they don't beat the computer with a stick to kill
> the demons inside.
I'd love to see someone try to do that :) That would be immensely
entertaining.
>> > Lucy: "You can't subtract five from three!"
>>
>> > Linus: "You can if you're stupid!"
>>
>> I hadn't heard that exchange before. That's a good one :)
>
>
> I got a Peanuts book when I was four for Christmas with that cartoon in
> it. A few months later my dad taught me about negative numbers, and the
> fact that something so obviously impossible could turn out to be so
> completely wrong so quickly has always stuck with me. All sorts of sh*t
> is possible if you just do it...
Yup. It often just takes a willingness to look at other possible ways
of approaching a problem.
--
Mason
--__--__--
Message: 6
Subject: RE: [fw-wiz] The home user problem returns
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2005 10:09:40 -0700
From: "Scott Pinzon" <Scott.Pinzon@watchguard.com>
To: "Paul D. Robertson" <paul@compuwar.net>,
"Chris Blask" <chris@blask.org>
Cc: "Mason Schmitt" <mason@schmitt.ca>,
"Marcus J. Ranum" <mjr@ranum.com>,
<firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com>
I've been watching with a certain morbid fascination as Marcus has
ranted in his own blog and in FW-WIZ (and who knows where else) that
educating users about security is one of the "dumbest ideas" and "if it
was ever going to work, it would have by now." I have tremendous respect
for you, Marcus (epecially since you have, I dunno, six times the years
in computer security that I do). But I can't help feeling, in my
pipsqueak opinion, that on this one you're way off base.
My reasoning, in short:=20
-- Ignorance is never better than knowledge in any realm. But particular
to network security, my experience is that most clueless users are also
people of good will who will cease dangerous behaviors once they
understand those behaviors ARE dangerous.
-- Educating users is another layer in "Defense in depth." If 10 out of
100 users click evil email attachments, and through education you reduce
that to 3 out of 100, you've improved that layer.
-- Educating users has been proven to work at company after company.
Help desk calls, viral infections, falling victim to phishing emails,
and more, have been quantitatively and demonstrably reduced at companies
that institute end-user security training.=20
-- And how do you know "it" (educating end users) is not working? We
have no before/after comparison on what the Internet would be like if
all of us who preach security had stopped five years ago. =20
Maybe I'm misunderstanding you, but my take-away from your blog article
is that you are so discouraged by end-user ignorance, you think we
should all stop wasting our breath on them. Your recommendation is that
we set up an environment through quarantining and what-not where users
have no opportunity to hurt themselves. In rebuttal, I cite the crusty
old maxim, "Genius has its limits, but stupidity is infinite." We CAN'T
(through technology) create an environment where clueless users can't
hurt themselves. To keep a network secure, we need users on our side. We
can get them there if we try.
Am I really the only one on this list who thinks so? Or Marcus, did I
misinterpret you?
SCOTT PINZON, CISSP
Editor-in-Chief, LiveSecurity Service
WatchGuard Technologies, Inc.
505 5th Ave. South | Suite 500 | Seattle | WA | 98104
206.613.6648
-----Original Message-----
From: firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com
[mailto:firewall-wizards-admin@honor.icsalabs.com] On Behalf Of Paul D.
Robertson
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2005 7:48 AM
To: Chris Blask
Cc: Mason Schmitt; Marcus J. Ranum; firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
Subject: Re: [fw-wiz] The home user problem returns
On Mon, 12 Sep 2005, Chris Blask wrote:
> The problem is that, without any sort of identity (and there is=20
> exactly 0.0000% of net traffic using anything worth calling identity),
> it is impossible to treat Identified traffic and Anonymous traffic=20
> differently, as they logically deserve.
Two words: Identity Fraud.
> Decentralized, distributed responsibility. If I own an auth server=20
> then I am responsible for the activities of those who use it. If I
You're willing to be responsible for your user's behavior? After
they're Trojaned?
Just like the encryption boundary problem that is the reason SSL is
severely broken as a concept, the use of identity can't be done in a
system that's not closed, and we don't have the methods, technologies or
wherewithall to close the software, transport and physical endpoints
everywhere.
Paul
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----
Paul D. Robertson "My statements in this message are personal
opinions
paul@compuwar.net which may have no basis whatsoever in fact."
_______________________________________________
firewall-wizards mailing list
firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
http://honor.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
--__--__--
Message: 7
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2005 14:19:09 -0400 (EDT)
From: "R. DuFresne" <dufresne@sysinfo.com>
To: Brian Loe <knobdy@stjoelive.com>
Cc: "'Mason Schmitt'" <mason@schmitt.ca>,
firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
Subject: RE: [fw-wiz] The home user problem returns
Organization: sysinfo.com
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
On Mon, 12 Sep 2005, Brian Loe wrote:
[SNIP]
>
> ONLY, and I mean ONLY, if that business has provided its customers with the
> idea that it CAN control such things. What we're finding now is that
> customers are getting even more dissatisfied with their providers because
> they can NOT prevent it from happening - it's CUSTOMER INITIATED!!!! The
> spam, the viruses...you can't prevent me, your customer, from being stupid.
> Trying to do so only ruins the service for all of us. Now MY bandwidth is
> getting eaten by your good intentions just because my neighbor can't keep
> his teenager off the porn sites.
>
[SNIP]
>
> PLEASE explain to me how my P2P app is going to affect you - my ISP - or my
> neighbor?
>
>
In a shared bandwidth scenario, the pron surfing kid and your p2p
connections are not mutually exclusive, they both have exactly the same
impact.
On another note to this thread as a whole;
beside ingress and egress filtering, how much might ISP's suffer for
correcting some of the windows network protocol errors by not passing
ports 135-139, 445 and 5000 etc across perimiters? Or even allowing them
to braodcast witin the ISP's realm? Certainly would work to neuter the M$
issues to a low noise level would it not?
Thanks,
Ron DuFresne
- --
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
admin & senior security consultant: sysinfo.com
http://sysinfo.com
Key fingerprint = 9401 4B13 B918 164C 647A E838 B2DF AFCC 94B0 6629
...We waste time looking for the perfect lover
instead of creating the perfect love.
-Tom Robbins <Still Life With Woodpecker>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)
iD8DBQFDJxghst+vzJSwZikRAtINAKCbvg+azBPgDDX0Vuu+HiZLVV5qFgCgpBb/
oI//E/0rkCrnW/Ez2VTpN0c=
=vIAB
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--__--__--
Message: 8
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2005 11:36:29 -0700
From: Mason Schmitt <mason@schmitt.ca>
To: "Paul D. Robertson" <paul@compuwar.net>
Cc: "Marcus J. Ranum" <mjr@ranum.com>, Kevin <kkadow@gmail.com>,
firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
Subject: Re: [fw-wiz] The home user problem returns
> Educating users to fix the problem doesn't work. Educating users there
> *is* a problem seems to work, just not en-mass.
>
Exactly right.
> Part of the prolem is that end-users are *used* to malware. When the
> computer gets too slow, they call "that person who understands this" to
> come clean off the computer and it's ok for another 2 months. Partially,
> Microsoft is to blame for taking the reliability out of computer
> software- the levee isn't designed for a big storm, and partially malware
> that doesn't kill its host has made these all tropical storms. (Hey,
> someone had to do the Digital Katrina thing, I've saved everyone else
> the trouble.)
>
The fact that users are accepting malware is indeed frustrating. From
the user education perspective, there are two approaches.
1 - Just keep drilling the mantra home (firewall, anti-virus,
anti-spyware, windows updates). Rinse and repeat. It has been shown
that constant repetition of a few basic concepts like this does work.
The effectiveness of this approach is amplified when there is personal
interaction between the person reiterating and the person listening.
This is why we need to get more people chanting the mantra.
2 - Just as you said above, let people know there is a problem. Some
will hear that and it will get them thinking - these are the people that
can make changes before it causes them pain. Others won't listen.
These are the people that are going to spend the $50+ every couple of
months to get their PC cleaned out and after a while will start getting
upset about it. Once they have endured enough upset, they will do
something about it. I have seen this play itself out over and over
again in the 4 years I have worked at this ISP. What's really
sad/entertaining is that some people need to go through the pain process
for each new threat that emerges.
> Anna K. and phishing work(ed) because of the social aspects of their
> delivery- we're still trying to fight a technical battle against a social
> problem. We have to take this to the social trenches at some point, or
> we'll be overrrun.
Sometimes people problems need to be solved entirely in (meat space /
carbon layer / layer8). Other times people problems can be solved
entirely in layer7 and below. However, more often than not, a solution
that combines both approaches will be the most effective. I believe
that's why we typically say that policy should be put in place and then
reinforced using technology. Where we run into problems is when
either/both side(s) of the coin is/are horribly unbalanced. Such is the
current state of the onion. The software sucks and people's
understanding of the Internet sucks.
That was a whole lot of blather about very little...
Try looking at the problem this way.
I know that some of you have been harping on these issues for a long
long time, some even longer than that. The problem is that while it
seems like a long long time to you, for the general public they are just
now starting to glimpse the issues.
I read somewhere that the general public's understanding of science lags
50 years behind those doing the research. I'm fairly certain that's
true - possibly even today despite some of the research being available
online.
So, what we have is a combination of hysteresis in public understanding
and an absence, until fairly recently, of a pain stimulus (money).
Getting people to understand is just going to take time - perhaps a fair
bit of time. But the process of understanding will be accelerated due
to the introduction of a pain stimulus in the form of monetary loss.
Now that we are seeing large scale information theft in the media
(CardSystems), laws concerning disclosure and organized crime getting
involved in online fraud; people/governments/vendors are going to take
notice. They just needed to feel it before they would react.
> Tell him if rants like that didn't work in the past, there's no way
> they'll work now... No, don't tell him- because all we can do is all we
> can do. Even if it's not enough, it's still a good fight.
Yes it is, but you need the patience of mother to be able to keep it up.
You'll have to keep doing it until the Internet community grows up.
Even then, it will still need to happen, but the message then will be
more sophisticated. Fortunately, you'll get more and more help along
the way as people start to wake up. These are just growing pains. Wait
until the the Internet reaches adolescence....
--
Mason
--__--__--
_______________________________________________
firewall-wizards mailing list
firewall-wizards@honor.icsalabs.com
http://honor.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
End of firewall-wizards Digest
No comments:
Post a Comment