[UNIX] Multiple Vendor ImageMagick Off-By-One Vulnerability

The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
- - promotion

The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent.

Get your security news from a reliable source.
http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html

- - - - - - - - -

Multiple Vendor ImageMagick Off-By-One Vulnerability
------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY

<http://www.imagemagick.org/> ImageMagick is "a suite of image
manipulation tools (animate, composite, conjure, convert, display,
identify, import, mogrify and montage) that are sometimes used by other
applications for processing image files". Remote exploitation of an
off-by-one vulnerability in ImageMagick, as included in various vendors'
operating system distributions, allows attackers to execute arbitrary
code.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
* ImageMagick version 6.3.4

Immune Systems:
* ImageMagick version 6.3.5-9

This vulnerability specifically exists in the ReadBlobString() function in
magick/blob.c as shown below.

3110 for (i=0; i < (long) MaxTextExtent; i++)
3111 {
3112 p=ReadBlobStream(image,1,buffer,&count);
...
3119 string[i]=(char) (*p);
3120 if ((string[i] == '\n') || (string[i] == '\r'))
3121 break;
3122 }
3123 string[i]='\0';

The variable "string" is a character array of length "MaxTextExtent". An
off-by-one buffer overflow will occur on line 3123 when "i" is exactly
"MaxTextExtent". This function is called from several image file
processing routines. Most of the buffers involved are stack based,
although some are on the heap.

Analysis:
Exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary
code in the context of the user.

One way of exploiting this vulnerability is to persuade a targeted user to
open a malicious image file with a program that utilizes the ImageMagick
library.

As the tools that are part of ImageMagick are sometimes used as helper
tools by other applications, this user may be the same as the web server
user. This scenario is somewhat more severe than the previously described
attack vector since the image processing can occur automatically.

Exploitation in stack-based scenarios depends on the stack layout, which
depends on the compiler and compiler options used to build the library.

Vendor response:
The ImageMagick maintainers have addressed this vulnerability with the
release of version 6.3.5-9. More information is available from the
following URL.
<http://studio.imagemagick.org/pipermail/magick-announce/2007-September/000037.html> http://studio.imagemagick.org/pipermail/magick-announce/2007-September/000037.html

CVE Information:
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-4987>
CVE-2007-4987

Disclosure Timeline:
09/04/2007 - Initial vendor notification
09/05/2007 - Initial vendor response
09/19/2007 - Coordinated public disclosure

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by
<mailto:idlabs-advisories@idefense.com> iDefense Labs Security Advisories.
The original article can be found at:
<http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=595>

http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=595

========================================

This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list.
To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com
In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com

====================
====================

DISCLAIMER:
The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind.
In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.